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NOTES

DOBOSZ v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
CO.*: REPRESENTATIONS IN
INSURANCE ADVERTISING
BROCHURE AS PART OF
THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
When a descriptive brochure is furnished to an insured individual, that brochure becomes part of the contract of insurance
if the insured relies on it in making the purchase, and if the
brochure differs from the policy.' This holding was reached by
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District in Dobosz v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company 2 The case also decided
that where the advertising brochure contained a pictorial representation of certain coverage, and where the sales agent orally
reinforced such coverage, the insurer was estopped from deny3
ing that the policy only covered losses expressed in the policy.
This article has three purposes: (1) to present the court's
analysis in Dobosz; (2) to critically analyze the case in light of
the precedent relied upon; and (3) to examine the impact of
Dobosz on the use of brochures from the view of the insurer and
the insured. What will become apparent from this article is that
the Dobosz court validly expanded the appropriate method by
which to construe an insurance agreement.
The plaintiffs in Dobosz were a husband and wife who
purchased a home and obtained a homeowners insurance "'AllRisk' Special Policy" from the State Farm Fire and Casualty
* 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 458 N.E.2d 611 (1983).
1. Id. at 679, 458 N.E.2d at 614. The primary cases used by the Dobosz
court in framing the issue were: Laib v. Fraternal Reserve Life Ass'n, 177 Ill.
App. 72 (1913); Weinberg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 88 Misc. 2d 82, 388
N.Y.S.2d 69 (1976); Morris v. Travelers Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. App.
1976); Barth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 257 A.2d 671
(1969).
2. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 458 N.E.2d 611 (1983).
3. Id. at 680, 458 N.E.2d at 615 (1983). The primary cases relied upon by
the court in regarding the estoppel theory were: Vogel v. American Warranty Home Serv. Corp., 695 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1983); INA Life Ins. Co. v.
Brundin, 533 P.2d 236 (Alaska, 1975); Lewis v. Continental Life & Acc. Co., 93

Idaho 348, 461 P.2d 243 (1969); Craver v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 37 Ohio
App. 2d 100, 307 N.E.2d 265 (1973).
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Company (State Farm). According to the Doboszes, the
purchase was made in reliance on a sales brochure. 4 In July of
1981, the policy was renewed for another year. During April of
1982, water leaked through the walls of the plaintiffs' basement.
Their sump pump had failed to work, thereby permitting water
to collect in the basement. The leakage caused damage with a
5
repair cost of $1,409.66.
The Doboszes then filed a claim under their homeowners insurance policy that State Farm refused to acknowledge. State
Farm denied coverage on the ground that the policy excluded
their type of water damage. 6 The trial court entered judgment
for State Farm finding that the policy excluded the type of damage claimed, despite the representation in the brochure.7 At
trial, the evidence showed that Mr. Dobosz, an attorney, contacted Paul Bucholz, an agent of State Farm, in order to learn
about obtaining homeowners insurance. Bucholz responded by
sending Dobosz a brochure; further, the agent indicated that the
brochure described the various types of coverage available. 8
Bucholz recommended that Dobosz purchase the "All-Risk"
policy, stating that it was the "Cadillac of the line." The agent
told Dobosz that explaining the policy would take a long time,
and that the brochure would show what the policy covered. 9 After receiving the brochure and reading it, Dobosz told Bucholz
to issue the "All Risk" policy. In selecting the policy, Dobosz
testified that he relied on the brochure concerning the risks
against which his home would be insured. 10
The brochure contained a number of captioned photographs
that applied to three different policies. Under the heading "AllRisk Special Policy," the brochure read that, "the 'All-Risk Special Policy' adds these coverages for your home not specifically
4. Dobosz, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 458 N.E.2d at 612.
5. Id. at 676, 458 N.E.2d at 612.
6. Id., 458 N.E.2d at 613. The policy was placed into evidence, and in

relevant part provided a definition of water damage as follows:
Water Damage, meaning:
a. flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, overflow of a body of water,
or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind;
b. water which backs up through sewers or drains, or
c. natural water below the surface of the ground, including water
which exerts pressure on, or seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk, driveway, foundation, swimming pool or other structure. * * *
Id. at 678, 458 N.E.2d at 614.
7. Id. at 676, 458 N.E.2d at 612. The proceeding was held without a jury

in small claims court.
8. Id. at 677, 458 N.E.2d at 612.
9. Id.
10. Id., 458 N.E.2d at 612-13.
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excluded."" Among the ten pictures under this heading was
one captioned "Water Damage," which depicted an open window through which rain was falling and collecting in a puddle
below. At the bottom of the policy, in small black print, it stated:
"This brochure contains only a general description of coverage
and is not a statement of contract. All coverages are subject to
2
the exclusions and conditions in the policy itself.'
Dobosz did not read the policy until after the damage occurred, stating at trial that he had not received it until then.
Bucholz testified that he had sent the policy to Dobosz. This issue was not resolved at trial. 13 The trial court found that despite
representations in the brochure, "water damage," as defined by
14
the policy, excluded the type of damage claimed.
The appeal taken by Dobosz focused upon the question of
whether an advertising brochure, containing a pictorial representation captioned "Water Damage," distributed by an insurance company through its agent, is part of the insurance
contract and controls over inconsistent language in the policy
itself. The state court of appeals held that the brochure became
part of the contract. 15 In arriving at its decision, the appellate
court referred to general principles of contract and insurance
law.
The appellate court first noted that in construing an insurance contract, the court should give effect to the intent of the
parties, which is determined from the unambiguous language of
the policy.' 6 Although the court found that the policy in question
clearly excluded water damage, it was aware that interpretation
of an insurance policy requires consideration of the contract as a
11. Id., 458 N.E.2d at 613.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 676, 458 N.E.2d at 612.
Id. at 679, 458 N.E.2d at 614.

16. Id. at 678, 458 N.E.2d at 613. The court relied on Seeburg Corp. v.
United Founders Life Ins. Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1039, 403 N.E.2d 503, 506
(1980) (clause in question using the phrase "in use" was clear and unambiguous). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1979), which

provides in part:
§ 202. Rules in Aid of Interpretation
(1) Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the cir-

cumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable
it is given great weight.
(2) A writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of
the same transaction are interpreted together.
(3) Unless a different intention is manifested,

(a) where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning;
(b)

technical terms and words of art are given their technical mean-

ing when used in a transaction within their technical field.
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whole. 17 The court then referred to cases that have considered
the contract as a whole and have held that a descriptive
brochure given to an insured becomes part of the insurance contract.'8 The principal considerations in those cases were the insured's reliance on the brochure in purchasing the insurance
and the differing representations of the brochure and policy. 19
17. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 678, 458 N.E.2d 611, 613 (1983). The court relied on
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schmitt, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1064, 419
N.E.2d 601, 602 (1981) (construing the policy as a whole, a "sister-in-law"
was not considered a part of the insured's family). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1979), supra note 16.
18. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 678, 458 N.E.2d 611, 613 (1983). The court considered: Laib v. Fraternal Reserve Life Ass'n, 177 Ill. App. 72 (1913) (discussed

infra text accompanying notes 47-50); Weinberg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
88 Misc. 2d 82, 388 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1976) (discussed infra text accompanying
notes 51-52); Morris v. Travelers Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. App. 1976)
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 55-59); Barth v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 257 A.2d 671 (1969) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 60-64).
While the Dobosz court relied on the above cases concerning individual insureds, the same principles apply in group purchases. The court
cited Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 59 Ill. 2d 522, 322 N.E.2d 454 (1975)
and Winston v. Trustees of the Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l
Union Welfare Fund, 110 Ill. App. 3d 163, 441 N.E.2d 1217 (1982).
In Hofeld, as in most cases concerning the purchase of group insurance,
the insured individual only received the certificate issued to him. If, as in
the Hofeld case, the provisions in the certificate contradict the policy terms,
the certificate will control. 59 Ill. 2d 522, 527, 322 N.E.2d 454, 457 (1975). In
Hofeld, the certificate did not conflict with the master policy, and the insured was charged with knowledge of the terms. Id.
In Winston, the plaintiff was a union member who was covered by
group insurance bought by the union. 110 Ill. App. 3d 163, 164, 441 N.E.2d
1217, 1218 (1982). After the plaintiff became totally disabled, he sought additional coverage pursuant to a policy booklet given to employees by the
union. Id. The insurance company denied the requested coverage. Id. The
court held that the booklet's terms were unambiguous, and the denial of
coverage was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 166, 441 N.E.2d at 1220. The
court did not expressly state that the booklet was part of the contract, but it
could be implied through the result. The court held, alternatively, that the
defendant who issued the pamphlet was estopped from denying its contents, thereby making the pamphlet a part of the insurance agreement. Id.
at 167, 441 N.E.2d at 1220.
For a discussion of this area of group insurance, see Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d
541 (1971).
19. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 678, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983). Other cases which
recognized the importance of reliance were: Providential Life Ins. Co. v.
Clem, 240 Ark. 922, 403 S.W.2d 68 (1966) (beneficiaries who purchased insurance based on a pamphlet had a right to rely on the pamphlet); Aker v.
Sabatier, 200 So.2d 94 (La. App. 1967) (brochure regarding professional liability policy was relied on and thus insurer was estopped from denying its
provisions); Craver v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 37 Ohio App. 2d 100, 307
N.E.2d 265 (1973) (insured who relies exclusively on advertising solicitation
in newspaper has a contract of insurance based on the provisions in the
solicitation); Beck v. Southern Oregon Health Serv. Inc., 255 Or. 590, 469
P.2d 622 (1970) (representation in insurer's brochure relating to prepaid
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The court then confronted Illinois case law which suggested
that brochures or other materials which describe coverage cannot vary express terms of the policy.20 The court distinguished
this case law on the ground that either the material in the
brochures did not differ substantially from the policy itseLfr 1 or
hospital/doctor policy were part of the insurance agreement, if relied
upon).
With regard to the question of reliance on brochures, pamphlets and
other soliciting materials, see 13A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE
§ 7534 (1976).
20. 120 111. App. 3d 674, 679, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983). Although the court
managed to distinguish contrary precedent, see infra notes 21 and 22, it
pointed to Illinois cases which it believed supported treating a descriptive
brochure as part of the insurance agreement. Dobosz, 120 111.App. 3d at 679,
458 N.E.2d at 614. They were Winston v. Trustees of the Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Welfare Fund, 110 111. App. 3d 163, 441
N.E.2d 1217 (1982) and Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 50 Ill. App. 3d 709,
365 N.E.2d 638 (1977).
In Winston, the plaintiff sought additional coverage pursuant to a descriptive booklet. The defendant denied the extension. The court found
that the language in the booklet clearly and unequivocably expressed an
extension provision. 110 Ill. App. 3d 163, 166-67, 441 N.E.2d 1217, 1219-20
(1982). The court stated that the defendant's denial was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 167, 441 N.E.2d at 1220. In making this determination, the
booklet was essentially treated as part of the insurance agreement. Id. at
167, 441 N.E.2d at 1220.
The Winston case also found for the plaintiff on the theory that the defendant should be estopped from denying the representations in the booklet. Id. at 167-68, 441 N.E.2d at 1220-21. The estoppel theory does not
expressly hold that the booklet becomes part of the insurance agreement
but, in essence and in result, there is no difference.
In Van Vactor, the brochure and the contract contained similar provisions. The only question before the court was what meaning should be
given to the terms since there were ambiguities. 50 Ill. App. 3d 709, 711, 365
N.E.2d 638, 640 (1977). In holding for the insured, the court referred to the
rule that ambiguities will be construed against the drafter, especially where
the language seeks to limit liability. Id. at 715, 365 N.E.2d at 643.
Although Van Vactor did not involve a situation in which the brochure
and the policy differed, as in Dobosz, the court analyzed the case as if the
brochure was part of the agreement in order to resolve an ambiguity. Id. at
711, 365 N.E.2d at 640. The defendant in Van Vactor argued that a construction of certain language in the master policy excluded the plaintiffs coverage. Id. at 714, 365 N.E.2d at 642. The court stated, however, that such a
construction of the terms would make their omission from the brochure inexcusable. Id. at 716, 365 N.E.2d at 644. The court stated that "significant
policy exclusions contained in a master contract but omitted from the
brochure distributed to policyholders should not be enforced." Id. (citing
Decker v. General Am. Ins. Co., 55 Hawaii 624, 525 P.2d 1114 (1974)). The
language of Van Vactor strongly suggested that the brochure become part
of the insurance agreement. The brochure and the policy, though similar,
were the court's reference points in construing the agreement, and the
court refused to place a construction on the brochure that would have created unenforceable policy exclusions. Id. at 716, 365 N.E.2d at 644.
21. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 679, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983). Here, the Dobosz
court pointed to Kleinman v. Commercial Ins. Co., 19 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 313
N.E.2d 290 (1974) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 69-72). The
Dobosz court took the view that if the certificate and the policy do not differ,
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even if outside material
did differ from the policy, it was not pre22
pared by the insurer.
Turning to the facts, the court determined that the
Doboszes' reliance on the brochure in procurring the insurance
policy, and the brochure's contradiction of the policy itself, warranted a finding that the brochure be treated as part of the insurance contract.2 3 From this essential determination, the court
proceeded to build its analysis logically and in accord with established contract and insurance law.
The court next addressed the ambiguity created in the
terms of the whole contract, now that the brochure was a part
thereof. 24 Relying on general contract law, the court determined
that where an ambiguity is created by the insurer, the terms are
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. 25 The
court noted that this principle is particularly applicable where
the insurer seeks to limit its own liability. 26 This rule of construction is premised on the rationale that because the power to
then the court is constrained to abide by the terms therein. 120 Ill. App. 3d
674, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983). But if there are representations in brochures
or other solicitation materials that differ substantially from the policy,
Kleinman is distinguishable. Id.
22. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983). The court referred to
Gross v. University of Chicago, 14 Ill. App. 3d 326, 302 N.E.2d 444 (1973) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 39-42 and 73-76). The Gross decision
did not pose a precedential threat to the holding announced in Dobosz. The
analysis is very different when, as in Dobosz, the insurer places materials
into the hands of the insured which contain provisions differing from the
written policy. There, the insurer assumes responsibility for its solicitation.
Contrary to the arrangement in Gross, the insurer in Dobosz was at no one
else's mercy but its own.
23. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 679, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983). See also Weinberg
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 88 Misc. 2d 82, 388 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1976) (brochure
relied on by insured held part of the insurance agreement); Barth v. State
Farm Fire &Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 257 A.2d 671 (1969) (if the defendant reasonably relied on a brochure in procuring insurance, it will become
part of the insurance contract).
24. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 679, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983). The court noted
that although it should not create an ambiguity where none exists (citing
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Moore, 103 Ill. App. 3d 250, 430 N.E.2d 641
(1981)), the policy and the brochure in this case clearly differed in substance. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 679, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983).
The court also determined that the ambiguity existed even though the
brochure contained a statement that the brochure was subject to the policy.
Id. citing Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 490 (1982) (if insurer wishes to limit liability under a
policy, it should use language that clearly and distinctly communicates to
insured the nature of limitations); Barth v. State Farm Fire &Cas. Co., 214
Pa. Super. 434, 257 A.2d 671 (1969) (crucial question of fact in determining
reasonable reliance was whether insurer informed insured of coverage
limitations).
25. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 679, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983). See also State
Farm Fire &Cas. Co. v. Moore, 103 Ill. App. 2d 250, 430 N.E.2d 641 (1981).
26. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 679-80, 458 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1983).

19841

Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

draft terms in a brochure is within the domain of the issuer/drafter, any resulting ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of the insured.27 The court then held that the policy, with
28
the brochure, provided coverage for the Doboszes' loss.
In addition to resolving the case on contract principles, the
court relied on an estoppel theory. Under estoppel analysis, the
insurer is estopped from relying on exclusionary clauses in the
policy when misleading descriptive brochures or other solicitation materials relating to coverage are distributed by the insurer. 29 When the representations of sales agents or brochures
induce the purchase of a policy, the company should be bound
30
by reasonable expectations of coverage that were created.
In determining what constitutes "reasonable expectations,"
the language of the policy is to be construed in light of the natu31
ral response that would be expected in any prospective holder.
The court determined that even though Mr. Dobosz was an attorney, he should be entitled to the same protection afforded the
ordinary lay person; that is, protection according to his or her
27. Id.

28. Id. at 680, 458 N.E.2d at 614-15.
In our view, and in recognition of the complications of insurance policy
provisions, it is not too much to ask of the insurer who markets policies
by the use of attractive and illustrative brochures to give fairly equal
prominence to exclusions and coverages. Given these principles, we
construe this policy with the brochure as providing coverage for the
claimed damage.
Id.
29. Vogel v. American Warranty Home Serv. Corp., 695 F.2d 877 (5th Cir.
1983) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 80-81); Lewis v. Continental
Life & Accident Co., 93 Idaho 348, 461 P.2d 243 (1969) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 82-85).
30. INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brundin, 533 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1975); Craver v.
Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 37 Ohio App. 2d 100, 370 N.E.2d 265 (1973). The
INA case candidly discussed insurance agreement formation. The court
recognized that a person forms his decision on factors other than the written policy. Salesmen who explain the terminology of the policy play a significant role. Advertising flyers and brochures often serve as the
inducement for a purchase. The court took a realistic view that these representations generate the purchase expectations with regard to coverage.
INA, 533 P.2d at 242. The court relied on the rule of interpretation, that a
policy holder's reasonable expectations as to coverage control, and bind the
insurer. Id.
31. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 679, 458 N.E.2d 611, 615 (1983). Weinberg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 88 Misc. 2d 82, 388 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1976) (discussed infra
text accompanying notes 87-91); Craver v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 37
Ohio App. 2d 100, 307 N.E.2d 265 (1973). In Craver, 37 Ohio App. 2d 100, 307
N.E.2d 265 (1973), the court stated that the language of the advertising solicitation should be interpreted according to the understanding of the audience to which it was directed. Id. at 106, 307 N.E.2d at 269. The court also
stated that even though certain caveats would have alerted a sophisticated
or suspicious reader, this would not erase the effect which the solicitation
had on the average reader. Id.
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own reasonable understanding. 32
Applying the facts to the rules espoused above, the court
found that the terms of the State Farm brochure, coupled with
the representations of the agent, Buchold, created Dobosz' reasonable expectation that the damage suffered was within the
terms of the insurance contract. 33 As a result, the defendant
was estopped from denying that the policy covered the damage
suffered. 34 State Farm argued, however, that a provision in the
brochure conditioned all representations in the brochure to the
terms of the policy. State Farm also sought to avoid liability on
35
the ground that the plaintiffs failed to read the policy.

The exclusionary clause in the brochure provided that the
policy "adds these coverages for your home plus others not specifically excluded. ' '36 The court noted that language in a descriptive brochure can limit liability only where the exclusions are
clearly referred to. 37 In the court's view, the general statement
32. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 680, 458
N.E.2d 611, 615 (1983). See also Puritan Life Ins. Co. v. Guess, 598 P.2d 900

(Alaska 1979) (fact that plaintiff was a lawyer does not effect his reasonable

expectations with regard to coverage). Cf. Weinberg v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am. 88 Misc. 2d 82, 388 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1976).
33. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 680, 458
N.E.2d 611, 615 (1983). One fact which the court considered was that the
plaintiff bought a policy called the "All-Risk Special Policy." It was described as including specified coverage under the protections of the basic
and broad type policies, "plus many others not specifically excluded." In
addition, the brochure made general reference to "Water Damage" under
the "All Risk" policy. Even though the sales agent and the plaintiff never
specifically discussed water damage, the agent stated that the policy covered everything, and that the brochure showed exactly what the policy covered. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 681, 458 N.E.2d at 615-16. See Standard of Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
Humphreys, 257 Ark. 618, 519 S.W.2d 64 (1975); Kleinman v. Commercial Ins.
Co., 19 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 313 N.E.2d 290 (1974); Morris v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
546 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. App. 1976).
In Standard, the plaintiff was insured under a group plan and was in
possession of a certificate of insurance. The certificate stated that the
schedule of benefits was "subject to the provisions and limitations of the
master policy." The certificate did not contain, as did the master policy, a
statement that the insurance covered only non-occupational hazards (plaintiff was killed on the job). However, the certificate clearly referred to the
limitations in the master policy. As the court found, "the certificate issued
to the employee recites that the certificate is subject to the terms and limitations of the master policy; recites that the certificate is mere evidence of
insurance provided by the master policy; and refers to the master policy's
provisionfor nonoccupationalcoverage." Standard of Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
Humphreys, 257 Ark. 618, 621, 519 S.W.2d 64, 67 (1975) (emphasis added).

Thus the court held that the master policy controlled. Id.
In Kleinman, the certificate of insurance under a group plan provided
that the member "is insured under and subject to all conditions and limita-
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alluding to the policy was inadequate.3 8
39
The court considered Gross v. University of Chicago,
which suggested that a brochure's general reference to the policy can be sufficient to give the insured notice that the policy is
the controlling document.40 The court noted that in Gross there
was no estoppel theory advanced, and the brochure was not prepared by the insurer. 41 The court also determined that any construction of Gross to the effect that an inconsistent policy
provision would dominate representations in a brochure drafted
by the insurer and relied upon by the insured, would not be
permitted.42
Finally, the court noted that an insured is generally charged
with notice of the terms of an insurance policy. 43 This is true
even when the policy is made available to the insured, but is
tions of said Group Disability Policy." Most importantly, the certificate recited that coverage would terminate at the member's 73rd birthday (the
issue in the case). Since the exclusions were clear and specific, the court
was constrained to rule against the insured. Kleinman v. Commercial Ins.
Co., 19 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1007, 313 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1974).
In Morris, the plaintiff was insured under a group plan and had a certificate of insurance. There was a dispute as to the effective date of coverage.
The certificate and the brochure clearly and explicitly provided the terms as
to when coverage would begin. As the court stated, "[t he intent to place
conditions upon the existence of coverage is manifest." Morris v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 477, 487 (Mo. App. 1977).
The above cases held that a brochure which clearly called attention to
coverage limitations in the policy subjected the insured to the policy. The
implication is that absent a clear expression of coverage limitations, the disclaimer would be ineffective.
App. 3d 674, 682, 458
38. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill.
N.E.2d 611, 616 (1983). Accord Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 132
Ariz. 529, 535, 647 P.2d 1127, 1133 (an insurer who wishes to limit liability
should employ language which clearly and distinctly communicates the
limitations to the insured), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 490 (1982); Barth v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 444, 257 A.2d 671, 676 (1969) (factual
question as to whether the insured knew of a specific coverage exclusion
was critical in determining if brochure was to be part of agreement).
39. 14 Ill. App. 3d 326, 302 N.E.2d 444 (1973).
App. 3d at 682, 458 N.E.2d at 616.
40. Dobosz, 120 Ill.
App. 3d at 337-38, 302 N.E.2d at 453.
41. Gross, 14 Ill.
42. Dobosz, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 682, 458 N.E.2d at 616. The court also referred to cases where there was a dominant theme of coverage through solicitations, and an inconspicuous and general caveat that coverage was
subject to the policy was held inadequate to overcome the impression made
by the solicitations. Id. See Craver v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 37 Ohio
App. 2d 100, 106, 307 N.E.2d 265, 269 (1973) (dominant theme and overall effect of advertising solicitations could not be biased by one or more caveats);
Barth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 442, 257 A.2d 671, 675
(1969) (brochure which stated in fine print that the representations were
subject to the policy held insufficient to overcome the clear representations
in the brochures).
43. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 IUl. App. 3d 674, 682, 458
N.E.2d 611, 616 (1983).
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never read." Under the facts of the case, there was an unresolved issue at trial as to whether Dobosz received a copy of
the policy. However, the court stated that there was enough
communication between Dobosz and State Farm to charge
Dobosz with notice that the policy should have been received by
him.45 Nevertheless, the court stated that the negligence on
Dobosz' part was not a barrier to a determination that State
Farm be estopped from denying coverage under the facts. This
was especially so in light of the contrary representations in the
brochure and the resulting ambiguities. The appellate court
then reversed the trial court and entered judgment for the plain46
tiffs for the amount sued.
The Dobosz decision rests on two separate legal theories.
The first theory was acceptance of the descriptive brochure as
part of the insurance agreement. The second theory was
estoppel.
BROCHURE AS PART OF THE AGREEMENT

In deciding that a brochure can become part of an insurance
contract, the Dobosz court relied on Laib v. FraternalReserve
Life Association.4 7 In Laib, a 1913 Illinois case, the beneficiary
of the policy wanted to put a pamphlet into evidence which was
relied upon and which supported her claim. The trial court de44. Id. See Florsheim v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Illinois, 75 Ill. App. 3d
298, 307, 393 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (1979).
45. Dobosz, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 682, 458 N.E.2d at 616.
46. Id. For the proposition that negligent failure to read the policy does

not preclude the estoppel theory, the court relied on Barth v. State Farm
Fire &Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 257 A.2d 671 (1969). In Barth, a factual
issue remained as to whether the insured had been informed of certain exclusions. If he had, the court stated, the plaintiff's reliance on the brochure
would not have been reasonable. Id. at 439, 257 A.2d at 676. Implied in
Barth was that the plaintiff could still rely on the brochure even though he
was charged with knowledge of the policy limitations. The brochure could
be part of the agreement since any statements of coverage limitations were
not sufficient to charge the plaintiff with actual knowledge. The factual issue of whether the plaintiff had specific knowledge of policy exclusions was
remanded for trial. Id.
The Dobosz court also referred to Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 490 (1982) for the proposition that plaintiffs negligence would not preclude a finding that the
brochure became part of the agreement. Dobosz, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 682, 458
N.E.2d at 616. In Sparks, the insured only read the brochures issued by the
insurer before purchasing. 132 Ariz. at 529, 647 P.2d at 1127. The court
stated that the brochures should be considered because of the effect they
have on the ordinary person as to the meaning of the policy. Id. at 538, 647
P.2d at 1134. Again, through implication, the Dobosz court extracted
Spark's reasoning that even though the plaintiff never read the policy, the
terms of the brochure would be considered.
47. 177 Ill.
App. 72 (1913).
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nied its admissibility. The appellate court, relying on a Kentucky case, 48 stated that the pamphlet was part of the contract
so long as the contract was entered into "upon the faith of the
representations therein. '49 The court, however, focused on the
question of whether the certificate issued to the insured was issued under proper authority. Unlike the Dobosz court, the Laib
court did not engage in construction of the terms of the pamphlet and policy.50 Laib alone could not justify the proposition
that the terms of a brochure could determine the obligations of
the parties, although its implications were seized by the Dobosz
court.
The other cases which persuaded the Dobosz court were
from other jurisdictions. The facts in Weinberg v. Insurance
Company of North America,51 a New York case, were most
analogous to those in Dobosz. Weinberg involved an attorney
who purchased a personal catastrophe insurance policy after
reading a brochure describing the policy as providing "umbrella" coverage. The brochure and the policy each made statements that created an ambiguity as to whether the insurer
would defend the insured in a slander action. Applying a rule of
construction to the ambiguity, the court construed the brochure
52
and the policy in order to provide coverage.
In Dobosz, the insured was an attorney who relied on a
brochure describing an "All-Risk" policy in making the
purchase. The brochure and the policy differed, creating an ambiguity which was resolved in favor of the insured. 53 The
Dobosz court tracked the legal framework of Weinberg, which
insisted upon reliance on the brochure. After allowing the
brochure to be read with the policy, any resulting ambiguity
54
was construed against the drafter.
Unlike Laib, the Weinberg decision was exactly that type of
case which the Dobosz court could rely upon in determining that
the brochure became part of the insurance agreement; in Weinberg, the brochure was issued under proper authority. The
Dobosz court looked not only to New York case law, but also to
Missouri and Pennsylvania case law.
48. Southern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Montague, 84 Ky. 653, 2 S.W. 443

(1887).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
N.E.2d
54.

Laib v. Fraternal Reserve Life Ass'n, 177 Ill.
App. 72, 75 (1913).
Id.
88 Misc. 2d 82, 388 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1976).
Id.
Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill.
App. 3d 674, 678-80, 458
611, 612-13 (1983).
Id. at 679, 458 N.E.2d at 614. See also Weinberg v. Insurance Co. of N.

Am., 88 Misc. 2d 82, 84, 388 N.Y.S.2d 69, 70 (1976).
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In Morris v. Travelers Insurance Company,5 5 the insured
was covered under a group plan of insurance, and was issued a
certificate of insurance.5 6 There was also a brochure which described coverage. 57 The Missouri Court of Appeals determined
that the brochure and certificate constituted part of the insurance agreement.5 8 Under the facts, however, no ambiguity was
created and, as a result, the insured was not covered. 59 The importance of Morris lies in its acceptance of the certificate and
the policy as part of the insurance agreement.
Similarly, in Barth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company,60 a grocery store owner sought coverage for his business.
In reaching an agreement with a sales agent, the insured relied
on a six-page descriptive "All-Risk" brochure. 6 1 The policy
stated that coverage was only for business hours; the brochure
did not. The insured did not read the policy. 62 The Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that if the insured reasonably relied on the brochure, its contents would be considered
terms of the agreement. 63 The reliance question was left un64
resolved and the case was remanded.
Weinberg, Morris and Barth established what the Dobosz
court considered the key factors in determining whether an insurance agreement should be construed in accordance with representations in a brochure: reliance on the brochure, and terms
in the brochure which differ from the policy itself.65 These cases
take a pragmatic approach to the relationship between the insurer and the insured. They recognize that insurance policies
are often written in incomprehensible language, and agents' representations and written solicitations are the primary sources of
information upon which the insured makes his decision.6 6 The
well-reasoned approach taken by these courts does justice to insurance purchasers.
55. 546 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. App. 1976).
56. Id. at 480.
57. Id. at 479.

58. Id. at 486.
59. Id. at 486-87.
60. 214 Pa. Super. 434, 257 A.2d 671 (1969).

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 436, 257 A.2d at 672.
Id. at 438, 257 A.2d at 673.
Id. at 444, 257 A.2d at 676.
Id.
65. Weinberg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 88 Misc. 2d 82, 84, 388 N.Y.S.2d
69, 70 (1976); Morris v. Travelers Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 477, 486 (1976); Barth v.
State Farm Fire &Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 444, 257 A.2d 671, 676 (1969).
66. E.g., Barth v. State Farm Fire &Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 441, 257
A.2d 671, 674 (1969).
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The most significant impediments to the Dobosz court in determining that the brochure was part of the insurance agreement were two Illinois cases: Kleinman v. Commercial
Insurance Company 67 and Gross v. University of Chicago.68 In
Kleinman,69 the plaintiff, an attorney, received a certificate of
insurance pursuant to a group plan. The certificate and the pot-"
icy both provided that coverage terminated at age 73. However,
the application for insurance was silent on this matter. The
plaintiff alleged that the application was a rider to the contract;
but the court decided that it was not part of the contract, but
simply an application. 70 The Dobosz court rightfully distinguished Kleinman on the grounds that the documents considered in Kleinman, the certificate and the policy, were materially
the same.7 1 Because the terms did not differ, the Kleinman
court did not have to reach the issue of which document, the
policy or the certificate, was controlling. The Kleinman case
was also distinguishable in that, in Dobosz, there was no appli72
cation at issue, but a brochure used to induce a purchase.
Nothing in Kleinman suggested that a brochure could not become part of an agreement.
The Dobosz court also distinguished Gross v. University of
Chicago.7 3 In Gross, the insured was covered under a group policy. During the course of coverage, the insured's representative
made statements to the insured which conflicted with the terms
of the policy. The Gross court held that the insurer was not
bound by the acts of the insured's representative. To hold otherwise would leave the insurer at the mercy of independent agents
74
who could vary the terms of a binding written agreement.
The facts in Gross differ strikingly from those in Dobosz. In
Gross, the court refused to hold the insurer to representations it
did not make in the marketplace. In Dobosz, the insurer was
responsible for placing the brochure in the hands of the insured.
Having done so, the insurer in Dobosz had to bear the consequences of any ambiguity created.75 The Dobosz court did not
have to strain in distinguishing the clearly different situation in
76
Gross.
67. 19 Ill.
App. 3d 1004, 313 N.E.2d 290 (1974).
68. 14 Mll.
App. 3d 326, 302 N.E.2d 444 (1973).

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

19 Ill.
App. 3d 1004, 313 N.E.2d 290 (1974).
Id. at 1006, 313 N.E.2d at 292 (1974).
Dobosz, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 679, 458 N.E.2d at 614.
Id. at 679, 458 N.E.2d at 614.
14 1ll.
App. 3d 326, 302 N.E.2d 444 (1973).
Id. at 335, 302 N.E.2d at 453.
Dobosz, 120 111. App. 3d at 680, 458 N.E.2d at 614.

76. Id.
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After the Dobosz court determined that the brochure was
part of the insurance agreement, it was only a matter of construction to determine the terms of the policy. Because State
Farm had drafted the brochure, the ambiguity it created as to
water damage was construed in favor of coverage. This rule of
construction is the most equitable where the policy is complicated and the provision is an attempt to limit coverage.7 7 As
Justice Taft stated over 100 years ago:
Policies are drawn by the legal advisers of the company, who study
with care the decisions of the courts, and, with those in mind, attempt to limit as narrowly as possible the scope of the insurance. It
is only a fair rule, therefore, which courts have adopted, to resolve
or ambiguity in favor of the insured and against the
any doubt
78
insurer.
ESTOPPEL

Holding State Farm liable for water damage coverage was
also based on estoppel theory. By distributing the brochure to
Dobosz, the insurer was estopped from denying the exclusionary clause in79the policy because the brochure was relied on by
the insured.
The estoppel theory in the insurance context was recently
held applicable in Vogel v. American Warranty Home Service
Corporation8° In that federal case applying Mississippi law, the
court held that the insurer was estopped from denying that an
insurance policy incorporated certain provisions in a brochure
after the insured relied on them.8 ' The reasoning was the same
in Lewis v. Continental Life and Accident Company,8 2 an Idaho
case. In Lewis, a nonworking employee was covered under a
group plan issued to the employer. The insurer was succeeded
by another insurer who made assurances that all employees
covered under the prior policy would be covered under the new
policy.83 After the employee died, the beneficiary sought recovery under the policy and the insurer refused, stating that the
new policy covered only working employees.8 4 The Lewis court
held that the successor insurer was estopped from denying that
77. Id.
78. Lewis v. Continental Life and Acc. Co., 93 Idaho 348, 350, 461 P.2d 243,

245 (1969) (quoting Manufacturers Acc. Indem. Co. v. Dorgan, 58 F. 945, 956
(6th Cir. 1893).
79. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 680, 458
N.E.2d 611, 615 (1983).
80. 695 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1983).
81. Id. at 880-81.
82. 93 Idaho 348, 461 P.2d 243 (1969).
83. Id. at 349, 461 P.2d at 244.
84. Id. at 350, 461 P.2d at 245.
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coverage existed for only working employees. 85
The estoppel theory is a viable means to bind an insurer to
its representations in brochures when they are relied upon by
the insured. This estoppel argument is all the more applicable
in the insurance context because of the complexity of insurance
policies. Insurance policies, even when read, can only be understood by a limited group of people. Brochures, however, provide
a comprehensible summary of what the particular policy contains. If an insurer supplies a summary of its policy in a
brochure in order to induce a purchase, the insurer should suffer the consequences of its representations.
An integral part of the estoppel argument is the insured's
reasonable reliance. Courts consider reliance in terms of the insured's reasonable expectations. Language used in an insurer's
representations is construed in a manner consistent with the
86
natural response which the words would evoke in an insured.
The Dobosz court considered Weinberg v. Insurance Company of North America8 7 in determining whether Dobosz's reliance was reasonable.8 8 In Weinberg, as in Dobosz, the plaintiff
was an attorney. In both cases, the insureds received brochures
which, in effect, stated that coverage extended to "All-Risks" or
gave "umbrella" protection. Neither brochure discussed specific
exclusions from coverage in the policy. The dominant theme of
the brochures was in favor of coverage. 89 As the court in Weinberg stated, "The natural response to the brochure of a prospective policy holder, lawyer or non-lawyer, would be to expect that
the policy would embody the coverage described in the
brochure." 90 Recognizing the similarities between Weinberg
and Dobosz, the Dobosz court did not hesitate in concluding that
plaintiff's reliance on the brochure was reasonable. 91
Related to the issue of reasonableness was the fact that the
Dobosz brochure contained a statement in small print at the
bottom of a page stating that coverage was subject to the terms
of the poicy.9 2 The court disregarded this warning because it
85. Id. at 352, 461 P.2d at 247.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
87. 88 Misc. 2d 82, 388 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1976).

88. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 680, 458
N.E.2d 611, 615 (1983).
89. Id. at 680-81, 458 N.E.2d at 615; Weinberg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
88 Misc. 2d 82, 84, 388 N.Y.S.2d 69, 70 (1976).
90. 88 Misc. 2d 82, 84, 388 N.Y.S.2d 69, 70 (1976).
App. 3d 674, 681, 458
91. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill.
N.E.2d 611, 615 (1983).
92. Id.
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was not specific. 9 3 The cases which have held that the warning

was sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice involved brochures
which specifically and clearly made reference to the limitation
on which the plaintiff sought to rely.9 4 In situations where there
were only general references to policy exclusions, the warning
was held to be inadequate.95
This analysis is consistent with the realities of complex insurance policies. Because the policy is so complex and unreadable, it is useless to refer the insured to the policy in a general
manner; once there, the insured is no better off than without the
reference. Because a brochure often serves as the inducement
for agreement, and is often the only document the insured will
ever read, the insurer must make clear in the brochure what is
excluded. The logic of the law is born out by the reality of the
negotiations.
It was at this time that the court again distinguished Gross
v. University of Chicago.96 The Dobosz court was concerned
that Gross could be interpreted to mean that general reference
in the brochure to policy exclusions would be adequate.97 The
Dobosz court correctly noted, however, that there was no estoppel theory advanced in Gross and thus the question was never
squarely resolved.9 8 Coupling that factor with the fact that the
misleading representations in Gross were not made by the insurer, the Dobosz court was satisfied that general exclusions are
not adequate warnings.99
The last issue which the court addressed within its estoppel
analysis was whether Dobosz' failure to read the policy, his negligence, precluded application of the estoppel theory. 10 0 The
court did not take issue with the principle that an insured is
charged with knowledge of the policy, whether it was read or
not.1 1 The court, however, was of the opinion that because of
the ambiguities between the brochure and the policy, the princi93. Id.
94. Standard of Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Humphreys, 257 Ark. 618, 621, 519
S.W.2d 64, 67 (1975); Kleinman v. Commercial Ins. Co., 19 Ill. App. 3d 1004,
1007, 313 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1974); Morris v. Travelers Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 477,
487 (Mo. App. 1976).

95. Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127,
1133, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 490 (1982); Barth v. State Farm Fire &Cas. Co.,
214 Pa. Super. 434, 442-43, 257 A.2d 671, 675 (1969).
96. 14 Ml1.
App. 3d 326, 302 N.E.2d 444 (1973).
97. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 681, 458
N.E.2d 611, 616 (1983).

98. Id. at 681, 458 N.E.2d at 616.
99. Id. at 681-82, 458 N.E.2d at 616.

100. Id. at 682, 458 N.E.2d at 616.
101. Id. (citing Florsheim v. Travelers Indem. Co., 75 Ill. App. 3d 298, 307,
393 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (1979)).
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ple would not impede the application of the estoppel theory. 0 2
In a sense, the ambiguity dominated the negligence.
The court was correct in finding that the insured's negligence would not preclude the estoppel theory. As previously
mentioned, most insurance policies are basically unreadable to
the layman. An ambiguity emerges when the insured, who is
charged with knowledge of the policy, relies on a brochure that
substantially differs from the policy. The ambiguity can not be
"washed away" merely because the insured is charged with notice of the policy when, in fact, the insured has actual notice of
the brochure. Because the insurer created the ambiguity, it will
be estopped from denying that the policy covers the damage in
03
question.
IMPACT OF DOBOSZ

The Dobosz decision is of major importance to insurers, insureds and lawyers. The principles of the case will affect the use
of brochures in sales, as well as in settlement or litigation.
There is also reason to believe that the Dobosz principles can be
extended to other business transactions.
Use of Brochures
The descriptive brochure is an important sales tool in the
highly competitive insurance industry. Because insurance policies can be extremely complex, brochures are used to explain
coverage. If insurance companies were to stop using brochures,
sales agents would need to expend much more time explaining
coverage through the policy itself. Further, future insureds
wishing to examine the coverage at their leisure with, for example, their spouses or business associates, could only refer to the
complex policy. The decision to purchase a particular insurance
policy would be more difficult and less informed. The amount of
insurance purchases would decrease. Furthermore, because the
selection of an insurance company can depend on the strength
of its established reputation, and because brochures can make
the company more visible, discontinued use of brochures could
mean financial disaster. Considered in this competitive light,
the brochure is an indispensable document at the sales level
and is here to stay.
When a claimant seeks the help of an attorney, the document predominantly considered is the policy. The lawyer's ex102. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 111. App. 3d 674, 682, 458
N.E.2d 611, 616 (1983).

103. Id.
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perience with the common law tells him that the policy
embodies the terms of the agreement and that the brochure is
not to be considered. In fact, in consulting American Jurisprudence on Trials for suggestions on how to properly depose an
insurer, seek discovery of documents, draft a bill of particulars
or determine the scope of coverage, the policy is the focus of
attention. 10 4 Nowhere is it suggested that the lawyer ask the insurer if brochures were ever issued, or for that matter, to ask the
insured if brochures were received. Nor are there any suggestions to make the brochure the subject of discovery, a bill of particulars, or a subpoena duces tecum. These factors permit the
inference that if a brochure was issued to an insured, the attorney could neglect it as a source for settlement or litigation. After the Dobosz decision, this should be very unlikely in Illinois.
Since the Dobosz court has held that, under certain circumstances, the brochure becomes part of the agreement, 105 the
brochure should be one of the attorney's prime considerations.
No longer should the attorney have tunnel vision with respect to
the policy, but he should view coverage through a wider angle,
considering the brochure on an equal level with the policy. The
attorney should do the most possible to discover the existence
of a brochure, and it should be considered throughout settlement or litigation on par with the policy. By doing so, the attorney can make positive use of either theory announced by the
Dobosz court. But the insurance industry is going to react to the
case, probably through the single opening the court left them.
Content of Brochures
Because the descriptive brochure is here to stay and because attorneys will make use of them in settlement and litigation, insurance companies will likely change the language in
their brochures. Specifically, disclaimers or references to the
policy as the sole document expressing the terms of the agreement will change. Because the Dobosz court affirmed the notion
that a general reference to the policy exclusion is inadequate, 10 6
the clause must specifically list the exemptions in order to avoid
the representation of the brochure. If the brochure lists exclusions, however, it will be similar to the policy and will completely defeat its intended purpose. If insurance companies try
to comport with the opening in Dobosz by specifically listing ex104. 12 AM. Jur. TRIALS, Actions on Life Insurance Policies 553 et seq.
(1964); 9 AM. JuR. TRIALS, Health and Accident Insurance 185-88 (1964); 4
AM. Jtm. TRIALS, Selling the Case-Plaintiff353-54 (1964).
105. Dobosz, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 680, 458 N.E.2d at 614.
106. Id. at 681, 458 N.E.2d at 615.
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clusions, they could lose sales. There is always the alternative
of having the brochure clearly and accurately portray coverage
as stated in the policy. But due to the competitiveness of the
insurance industry, the content of the descriptive brochure will
probably not change for fear of defeating the brochure's persuasive powers. This conflict can only be overcome by brochures
that are honest and accurate with respect to exclusion.
Dobosz and Other Sales Transactions
The Dobosz case announced that if a seller makes a descriptive representation which is relied on by the buyer, the representation will control over an inconsistent term embodied in a
written contract. 10 7 This will be true unless the descriptive document specifically and clearly lists all the material variations
from the written contract. 10 8 There is no reason why this principle should not apply to other business transactions. For example, if a condominium is advertised in a newspaper with the
following language, "facilities including: sauna, parking
(monthly charge) . . ." what would be the consequences if the
buyer moves in and finds out that a use of the sauna costs $5 per
visit? The advertisement specifically indicates that parking is
for a fee, but no sauna fee is mentioned. If the buyer can prove
reliance on the ad, this ad should become part of the agreement
or the seller should be estopped from denying that sauna use
was free. This is the Dobosz analysis. There is no reason to
treat analysis under an insurance context different from sales or
rentals of real estate where descriptive advertisements are utilized. In fact, whenever descriptive brochures or advertisements are used to sell goods or services, whether it be real
estate, securities, commodities, furniture, automobiles, vacation
packages, or insurance, the Dobosz reasoning should be applicable. In settings other than insurance, misleading references
should not be controlling when the advertisement serves to induce, and does induce, a subsequent purchase. Business advertisers should be required to specifically list all material facts,
exclusions or charges when they use descriptive solicitations in
the same manner that insurance companies must. This practice
will greatly enhance the honesty and integrity of commercial
transactions.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company 109 held that
a descriptive brochure furnished by an insurer will become part
of an insurance agreement if relied upon by the insured and that
the insurer will be estopped from denying that the policy excludes coverage represented in the brochure. The decision creates a principle in Illinois which conforms with the reasonable
expectations of insurance buyers. The decision is not a fatal attack on contract law but, rather, a well-reasoned opinion which
does justice to our adaptive and responsive legal system.
Dobosz will prove useful, not only in the insurance setting in
which it arose, but in all commercial transactions where descriptive solicitations are involved.
Michael Lowe

109. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 458 N.E.2d 611 (1983).

